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The purpose of this paper is to explore financial instability in this case due to a housing 
crisis and defaults on mortgages. The model incorporates heterogeneous banks and 
households. Mortgages are secured by collateral, which is equal to the amount of housing 
which agents purchase. Individual default is spread through the economy via the interbank 
market. Several comparative statistics illustrate the directional effects of a variety of shocks 
in the economy. 
 
Resumen 
El objetivo de este documento es explorar la inestabilidad financiera, que en este caso 
obedece a una crisis inmobiliaria y mora de créditos hipotecarios. El modelo incorpora 
bancos y hogares heterogéneos. Las hipotecas están respaldadas por garantías, por un 
monto igual al valor del bien transado. La mora individual se traspasa a la economía vía 
mercado interbancario. Varias estadísticas comparativas ilustran los efectos direccionales 













We are grateful to the seminar participants for their helpful comments at Saïd Business School, Oxford University, at the 
12th Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, at Norges Bank, at Keele University, at University of Illinois and to 
Raphael Espinoza, Udara Peiris and especially Simon Gilchrist. We also acknowledge the financial support by the Central 
Bank of Chile. All remaining errors are ours.   1
1. Introduction 
The current crisis has centred on borrower defaults on mortgages, and the knock-on 
effects of that on banks' own credit standing (and in several cases their own default), and 
hence on tightened conditions for lending to new (mortgage) borrowers.  No model which 
does not incorporate such key elements, or at least most of them, can possibly hope to 
capture the defining features of the current crisis, certainly not standard DSGE models 
which (mostly) assume away the possibility of default altogether! 
 
What we have done in this paper is to build on our previous model of a system in which 
default plays a central role for both borrowers and banks, and in which financial 
intermediation and money, therefore, have a necessary real function, to include both an 
additional good, housing, in addition to the prior composite basket of other goods and 
services, and an additional agent, a new entrant to the housing market.  Our previous 
papers on this include Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2004, 2005, 2006a and b). 
 
Dealing with a model with default and heterogeneous agents is not straightforward, which 
is why standard DSGE models abstract from such concerns, despite their resulting lack of 
realistic micro-foundations.  We, therefore, regard this paper as a preliminary step in a 
longer exercise.  In particular, the shocks that we model in the second period of our two 
period model, (the first being an initial predetermined set-up period), can be categorized 
as supply shocks, in which the endowment of our agents declines greatly in the case of 
adverse shocks. Nevertheless, our model is general enough to allow for the examination 
of a wide variety of shocks, which can lead to financial instability. 
 
In practice, the main adverse shock in 2007/8 was a sharp decline in housing prices (in 
the USA), whereas previously they had been expected to continue rising, or to hold steady 
at worst.  In a future version of this paper we will experiment with this and other financial 
shocks.  The main reason for proceeding with the current model is simply shortage of 
time, (with this kind of simulation model the authors learn as they go along, and we 
started with the shocks that we had used previously in our prior work).  But there were 
adverse supply shocks facing Western economies, in the guise of rising energy and 
commodity prices, in 2007/8, and these played a role in worsening the current downturn.  
Furthermore we can, and do, include in our simulations examples of changes in financial 
conditions, e.g. changes in the money stock (interest rates) and in bank capital 
endowments, so we can potentially explore how financial policy measures (e.g. 
government recapitalisation of banks) may affect the outcome.  Nevertheless this should 
be treated as a preliminary exercise. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In Section II we briefly reprise the basic structure of 
the GST model and detail the innovations that we have made here.  In Section III we set 
out how the model works and its clearing conditions.  In Section IV we report our choice 
of exogenous parameters for our numerical simulation and describe the resulting 
equilibrium values.  Then in Section V, we report on the comparative statics of changes in 
the parameters chosen.  Section VI concludes. 
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With such a large, and alas complicated, model there are a vast number of such exercises 
that could be run, each with an accompanying set of tables and diagrams.  While in one 
sense this is the strength of this approach, since one can examine a huge variety of 
potential shocks and policy responses, both individually and in conjunction, it can also 
lead to a mind-boggling multiplication of detail. 
 
In pursuit of focus and comparative simplicity, we are focusing here on just 4 examples.  
These are a decrease in the money supply in the initial period, an increased desire to take 
on risk, (as occurred in 2003-6, and leads to adverse shocks having a stronger effect on 
the system), a (foreseen) intervention by the authorities to provide liquidity assistance in 
very bad states, and finally a compound combination of the former two simultaneously, 
(partly to examine how non-linear are the resulting effects). 
 
2. The background set-up 
 
Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2004, 2006) and Tsomocos (2003) have developed 
models of financial stability that are rich enough to include defaultable consumer loan, 
deposit and interbank markets. In their models consumers maximize their expected utility 
from consumption of goods and banks maximize their expected profits. The main 
financial imperfection in Goodhart et al (2004, 2006) is that they assume that individual 
bank borrowers are assigned, by history or by informational constraints, to borrow from a 
single bank. Money is introduced by a cash in advance constraint, whereby a private 
agent needs money to buy commodities from other agents; commodities cannot be used to 
buy commodities. Similarly they assume that agents needing money can always borrow 
cheaper from their (assigned) bank than from other agents; banks have an informational 
(and perhaps scale) advantage that gives them a role as an intermediary. The amount of 
loans they repay is a choice variable for consumers, thus default in these models is 
endogenous. 
 
In their general model (2006) there are a set of heterogeneous private sector agents with 
initial endowments of both money and commodities; it is an endowment model without 
production. There is also a set of heterogeneous banks, who similarly have differing 
initial allocations of capital (in the form of government bonds). There are two other 
players, a Central Bank which can inject extra money into the system through open 
market operations (OMOs), and a Financial Supervisory Agency, which can set both 
liquidity and capital minimum requirements and imposes penalties on failures to meet 
such requirements and on defaults. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to model the market for mortgages and to examine the 
implications of default in bank lending and of a housing market crisis. To do so, we alter 
the above framework in the following ways. 
 
1.  We introduce another good into the economy which is durable and gives utility in 
every period. The utility of consuming this good resembles the utility from buying   3
a house. For tractability the durable good (house) is assumed to be infinitely 
divisible. 
2.  We explicitly model a market for mortgages. Consumers enter a mortgage 
contract to buy housing which they pledge as collateral. They default on their 
mortgage when the endogenous value of collateral is less than the amount they 
have to repay (Geanakoplos, 2003, Geanakoplos and Zame, 1995). When they 
default the bank seizes the amount of housing pledged as collateral and 
immediately offers it in the next period housing market. In this sense default is 
highly discontinuous as consumers do not choose the exact amount they want to 
default (as in the model discussed above), but only decide on whether to default or 
not
1.  
3.  We introduce a new agent λ  who is only "born" in period two. The motivation 
behind this is that the healthy functioning of the housing market generally depends 
on the existence of first time buyers.  
4.  We allow for short-term loan markets operating within each period. This was not 
necessary in the Goodhart et al. models, but in our analysis it plays a crucial role 
to provide credit to first time buyers, i.e. Mr.λ . For consistency, all agents can 
borrow short-term. In this market there is no uncertainty regarding repayment. We 
have the Central Bank intervening in the short-term loan markets in the second 
period to keep the interest rates (in the good state) at reasonable levels.  
5.  Since we are not considering wider asset markets, we exclude capital requirements 
for banks from our analysis. 
3. The model  
Given the limited participation in the loan markets in our model, we need at least four 
agents-households ( ,,, α βφλ) and two commercial banks ( , γ δ ). There are two periods 
and S states of the world.  All agents maximize their utility over the consumption of the 
good and of housing in every period  (0,1) tT ∈ =  and statesS ∈ . Banks maximize their 
expected profits in the second period. The set of all states is given by { }
* 0 sS S ∈= ∪ . 
 
Agent  (,) h α β ∈   is endowed with the good at every
* sS ∈ , whereas agent λ  at 
everysS ∈ , since he enters the economy only in the second period. Agent φ  is endowed 
with houses only at 0 t = . Agents α  and φ  interact with bankγ , whereas agents β  and 
λ  with bankδ . All households are also given government cash free and clear of any 
obligations ( * 0
s m ≥ ). Both endowments and cash are allowed to vary across states of 
nature. 
 
The Central Bank acts in the interbank market at t=0 by providing liquidity 
CB M  and in 
the short-term loan markets at t=1 by providing liquidity 
CB
s Mγ  and 
CB
s Mδ  in those markets 
organized by banks γ  and δ  respectively. 
 
                                                 
1 Shubik and Wilson (1977) and Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) analyse continuous default.   4
In the following we give the timeline of our model and specify the optimization problems 
for all the participants in the economy. 
 
3.1 The Time Structure of Markets 
 
In each period tT ∈ , six markets meet: the short-term (intraperiod) loan, mortgage, 
deposit and interbank (intertemporal) markets meet simultaneously, and then the good 
and housing markets. Finally, short-term loans come due at the end of the period. This 
set-up maximizes the number of transactions possible and allows agents to borrow in the 
short term money market in order to invest in the long term bond or asset market. It also 
allows for an explicit speculative motive for holding money. Agents have the option of 
investing cash in the short loan market, and then carrying it over to the next period. The 
only reason why they may not do this is because they believe that they will get a higher 
return from holding deposits. While preserving Keynesian motives on the uses of money, 
it also provides a rationale for an upward sloping term structure. 
 
Figure 1 indicates our time line, including the moments at which the various loans and 




Figure 1: CB: Central Bank, B: Commercial Banks, H: Households   5
3.2 The agents’ optimization problems and market clearing conditions 
3.2.1 Household α ’s and β ’s optimization problem 
Each consumer  ( , ) h α β ∈  maximizes his payoff, which is his utility from consumption of 
the good and the house
2. In order to acquire housing he enters a mortgage contract, which 
he has to repay in the last period. The amount of housing that he purchases is pledged as 
collateral. He honors his mortgage when the value of housing that he has bought is greater 
than the amount he has to repay. If it is lower, then he defaults on his mortgage and the 
bank that extended the mortgage seizes the collateral. In essence he repays the minimum 
between the two values, i.e.min( value of collateral,mortgage amount ) . We denote by 
1
h SS ⊂   the set of states that agent h does not default on his mortgage, 
i.e. 1 { :value of collateral mortgage amount}
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(i.e., expenditure for housing at t=0 ≤ amount borrowed short-term at t=0 + mortgage 
amount + initial private monetary endowment) 
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h sS ∈ +mortgage repayment ≤ 
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(i.e. expenditure for housing in the second period, state  1
h sS ∉ ≤ amount borrowed short-
term + private monetary endowment in 
h
1 sS ∉ ) 
                                                 
2 In our simulations we use a CRRA utility function to account for wealth effects}   6
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(i.e., short-term loan repayment ≤ good sales in 
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k γ = for h α =  and k δ =  for h β =  
2
h
s b ≡amount of fiat money spent by hH ∈  to trade in the housing market in 




s q ≡amount of goods offered for sale by hH ∈  in 
* sS ∈  
h μ ≡ mortgage amount that hH ∈  takes out 
h
s μ ≡short-term borrowing by hH ∈  in 
* sS ∈  
k r ≡mortgage rate offered by bank k 
k
s r ≡short-term rate offered by bank k in 
* sS ∈  
1 s p ≡ price of the good in 
* sS ∈  
2 s p ≡price of housing in 
* sS ∈  
1
h
s e ≡endowment of goods of hH ∈  in 
* sS ∈  
h
s m ≡monetary endowment of hH ∈  in 
* sS ∈  
3.2.2 Household φ ’s optimization problem 
Agent φ  is endowed with housing at t=0, some (much) of which he sells to buy goods for 
consumption . He then deposits interperiod a part of the sales' receipts for use in the 
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( . ., expenditure for goods + interperiod deposits amount borrowed short-term +
private monetary endowment at t=0)
ie ≤
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(i.e., short-term loan repayment ≤housing sales at t=0) 
 
  02 02 qe
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(i.e. quantity of housing sold at t=0 ≤ endowment of housing at t=0) 
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(i.e., expenditure of goods ≤ amount borrowed short-term +deposits and interest payment 
+ private monetary endowment in s) 
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(i.e. short-term loan repayment ≤ housing sales in s) 
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φ ≡amount of fiat money spent by φ  to trade in the goods market in 
* sS ∈  
2 s q
φ ≡amount of housing offered for sale by φ  in 
* sS ∈  
d
φ ≡ deposit amount for φ  
s
φ μ ≡short-term borrowing by φ  in 
* sS ∈  
d r ≡deposit rate 
s r
γ ≡short-term rate offered by bank γ  in 
* sS ∈  
02 e
φ ≡endowment of housing of φ  at t=0 
s m
φ ≡monetary endowment of φ  in 
* sS ∈  
 
3.2.3 Households λ ’s optimization problem 
 
Agent  λ   enters the economy in the second period and is endowed with goods. His 
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(i.e., expenditure for housing ≤   amount borrowed short-term + private monetary 
endowment in s) 
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λ ≡amount of fiat money spent by $\lambda$ to trade in the housing market in sS ∈  
1 s q
λ ≡amount of goods offered for sale by λ  in sS ∈  
s
λ μ ≡short-term borrowing by λ  in sS ∈  
s r
δ ≡short-term rate offered by bankδ  in sS ∈  
1 s e
λ ≡endowment of goods of λ  in sS ∈  
s m
λ ≡monetary endowment of λ  in sS ∈  
 
3.2.4 Bank γ ’s optimization problem 
Bank γ  (as also bankδ ) maximizes its expected profits in the second period. In the first 
period it borrow from the interbank market, since it is relatively poor in initial capital, and 
extends credit in the short-term loan and mortgage markets. It also receives deposits 
fromφ . In the second period it receives the repayment on the mortgage it extended (full 
repayment for 1 sS
α ∈ , partial elsewhere since the value of the collateral is less than the 
amount of the mortgage), repays its interbank and deposit borrowing and extends credit 
short-term. Its maximization problem is as follows
3: 
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2
,,,, max ( )
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≤  (17) 
(i.e. short-term lending + mortgage extension ≤   interbank loans + consumer deposits   
+initial capital endowment at t=0) 
  00 (1 ) (1 ) s S sdI s s mm r m r e
γγγ γ γ γ γγ μμ ++≤ + + ++∀ ∈  (18) 
(i.e., short- term lending + deposit repayment + interbank loan repayment ≤ effective 
mortgage repayment + first period short-term loan repayment + capital endowment 
insS ∈ ) 
 
 (1 ) s S ss s mr
γγ γ π = +∀ ∈  (19) 





γ π ≡bank  s γ′  profits at state sS ∈  
                                                 
3 Banks' risk-aversion is captured via a quadratic objective function, as in essence they are facing a portfolio 
problem and we want to capture diversification effects as closely as possible}   9
m
γ ≡mortgage extension by bank γ  
s m
γ ≡short-term loan extension by bank γ  at state 
* sS ∈  
I
γ μ ≡ interbank borrowing by bank γ  
d
γ μ ≡amount borrowed from consumers in the form of deposits by bank γ  
s r
γ ≡effective repayment rate on the mortgage at state sS ∈  
s r
γ ≡short-term rate offered by bank γ  in 
* sS ∈  
ρ ≡interbank rate 
s e
γ ≡capital endowment of bank γ  at state 
* sS ∈  
 
3.2.5 Bank δ ’s optimization problem 
 
Bank δ   maximizes its expected profits in the second period. In the first period it deposits 
in the interbank market, since it is relatively rich in initial capital, and extends credit in 
the short-term loan and mortgage markets.  In the second period it receives the repayment 
on the mortgage it extended (full repayment for 1 sS
β ∈ , partial elsewhere since the value 
of the collateral is less than the amount of the mortgage), receives payment from 
depositing in the interbank market and extends credit short-term. Its maximization 
problem is as follows: 
 
  ( )
2
,,, max ( )






Π= − ∑  
s.t. 
  0I 0 m+ m+ d e
δ δδ δ ≤  (20) 
(i.e., short-term lending + mortgage extension ≤ interbank loans + consumer deposits + 
initial capital endowment at t=0)  
  00 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) s S ss I s mm r m r d e
δδ δ δ δ δ δ ρ ≤+ ++ ++ + ∀ ∈  (21) 
(i.e., short – term lending ≤ effective mortgage repayment + first period short – term loan 
repayment + interbank deposits and interest payment + capital endowment in sS ∈ ) 
 (1 ) s S ss s mr
δδ δ π = +∀ ∈  (22) 
(i.e., profits=short-term loans repayment sS ∈ ) 
 
s
δ π ≡ bank  s δ′ profits at state sS ∈  
m
δ ≡mortgage extension by bank δ  
s m
δ ≡short-term loan extension by bank δ  at state 
* sS ∈  
I d
δ ≡interbank deposits by bank δ  
s r
δ ≡effective repayment rate on the mortgage at state sS ∈  
s r
δ ≡short-term rate offered by bank δ  in 
* sS ∈  
s e
δ ≡capital endowment of bank δ  at state 
* sS ∈  
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3.3 Market clearing conditions 
There are six market categories in our model (goods, housing, mortgage, short-term loan, 
consumer deposit and interbank markets). Each of these markets determines a price that 
equilibrates demand and supply in equilibrium). 
 
3.3.1 Goods Market 
The goods market clears when the amount of money offered for goods is exchanged for 




























3.3.2 Housing Market 
 
The housing market clears when the amount of money offered for housing is exchanged 
for the quantity of housing offered for sale. When agent hH ∈  defaults on his mortgage 


































































































When agent  (,) h α β ∈  defaults on his mortgage, the amount of housing his has pledged 
as collateral will be offered by his bank for sale in the market. This amount is equal to the 





. For example, in state 
11 1 \ sS S S
β αβ ∈∩  agent α  (but not β ) defaults, thus the amount of housing he purchases 
in the initial period and pledged as collateral will be offered for sale by bankγ .   11
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3.3.6 Interbank Market 












3.4 Definition of Equilibrium 
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(ii) All markets (23)-(38) clear. 
 
4. Discussion of Equilibrium 
 
Hereafter, we investigate a parametrized version of the model whereby in the second 
period only three states of nature are possible. We have chosen the exogenous parameters 
in our model in such a way as to be able to illustrate a housing and mortgage crisis. Their 
initial values are presented in Table 1. The initial equilibrium which our model yields is 
presented in Table 2 and analysed below. 
 
In the initial equilibrium we examine three different scenarios which can occur in the 
second period. State 1 occurs with the highest probability and state 2 is more probable 
than state 3. State 1 is the good period in which neither borrower defaults. In state 2 one 
of the two agents, Mrβ , defaults on his mortgage debt, but the other does not. In state 3 
both default. Agent α  is richer in endowments of the good in the first period, whereas 
agent β  is relatively richer in the second state in the second period. Bank γ  has less   13
initial capital than bankδ , while it has more capital in the second period. The capital of 
both banks in the second period can be interpreted as outside banking profits or capital 
injections obtained in the second period and  will play a crucial role in the comparative 
statics we  perform. We have chosen the parametrization to motivate lending in the 
interbank market and in particular to motivate bank δ  to deposit in the interbank rate. 
 
The level of default on the mortgages depends on the relative -second period- differential 
between the value of houses that each agent has bought and the mortgage amount they 
have to repay. Agentα , who is richer in the first period, needs to take a comparatively 
lower loan to value mortgage for the amount of houses he wants to purchase than agentβ , 
since he can finance the purchase through the sale of goods in the first period. As a result 
the effective return to the lending bank on the mortgages in state 3 when both agents 
default will be higher for α  thanβ . In combination with the fact that α  does not default 
in state 2, this results in a lower interest rate on the mortgage for α  than forβ , since 
rational expectations are assumed throughout. 
   14
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s m : Private money held by households in state 
* sS ∈  
0 e : Initial capital of banks 
s e : Additional capital of banks in state $s\in S 
CB M : Money supply at t=0 
CB
ks M : Money injection by the Central Ban in the short-term loan market organized by 
bank  { } , k γ δ ∈  in state sS ∈  
s θ : Probability of state sS ∈  
 
 
In our simulation the prices of the good and of the house move in a reverse way in the 
second period. The good is relatively more expensive in state 2 than 1 and in state 3 than 
2. The opposite holds for the price of the house. The intuition behind the result is quite 
simple, since the model is driven by adverse supply shocks to goods' endowments, worse 
in state 3 than in state 2. Agents default on their mortgages when the value of the house is   15
low. This happens when the endowments of goods are low, an adverse supply shock, 
since agents will not have enough income to allocate to the housing market. In turn this 
implies that the price of the good should rise. 
  
In order to buy the house, agents α  and β  sell goods in the first period and take out a 
mortgage as well. This creates  income forφ , the initial owner of the housing stock, who 
uses it to purchase goods and deposits the rest in the interperiod deposit market. In state 1 
when α  and β  do not default on their mortgages, and then find themselves with more 
houses than they want, they sell some of the amount they bought in the previous period 
(house prices are high relative to goods prices, and utility maximization leads α  and β  
to switch out of housing into goods)
4. This is possible as the economy is going well, 
endowments of goods are high and there is a strong demand for housing from agent λ  a 
first time buyer who enters the economy in the second period. Agent φ   also finds it 
profitable to sell some of the housing he is left with at those prices. 
 
However, in state 2 in period 2 when Mr β  defaults on his mortgage and essentially loses 
his house, he finds himself in a situation when he still wants to purchase some housing. 
Although the supply of houses due to delinquencies is high, his demand in combination 
with  s α′  and  s λ′  prevents the price of houses from collapsing. This gives on incentives 
to φ  to sell some of the housing he owns, as in state 1. 
 
One would expect the same scenario to occur in state 3. However, since both agents α  
and  β   become extremely poor in their endowments of goods in that state, so their 
demand for houses is drops precipitously. As a result the housing market should collapse 
and agentλ , who is the only one endowed with a sufficient amount of the scarce good, 
would enjoy the services from the purchase of housing at a very low price. The reason 
that this cannot happen is twofold. First, agent φ  finds it profitable to purchase back 
some of the houses he sold in the first period
5, thus the demand for housing is maintained 
as does the price. The second and most important one lies in the liquidity constraints that 
all agents face. In state 3 banks are short of liquidity. Hence, they are only willing to lend 
money short-term at a very high interest rate. Although the good is very expensive, agent 
λ   can only find credit at an extremely high interest rate, which prevents him from 
enjoying the full benefits of the falling housing market. This is not the case for φ  as he 
has money at hand from depositing in the first period. 
 
Finally, lower prices is the last period are outweighed by the high real interest rates. Thus, 
by the Fischer effect short-term interest rates rise. 
                                                 
4 Their cash-in-advance constraints have been adjusted to include housing sales as well as goods' sales 
5 Since φ  does not sell any houses in state 3 he does not demand a short-term loan   16
 
Table 2: Initial Equilibrium 
Prices  Interest rates 
Loans/Deposits 





mortgages  Goods   Houses 
01 4.10 p =   0.079 r
γ =   12.33
α μ =   1 6.23
λ μ =   11.43 m
γ =   1 100% v
α =   01 7.20 q
α =   02 49.78 b
α =  
11 2.60 p =   0.123 r
δ =   0 29.47
α μ =   2 6.97
λ μ =   25.50 d
γ μ = 2 100% v
α =   11 4.42 q
α =   12 0.09 q
α =  
21 3.10 p =   0 0.043 r
γ =   1 12.80
α μ =   3 18.46
λ μ = 69.07 I
γ μ = 3 62% v
α =   21 4.48 q
α =   22 5.12 b
α =  
31 12.31 p =   1 0.047 r
γ =   2 13.65
α μ =     0 83.24 m
γ = 1 100% v
β =   31 0.35 q
α =   32 1.24 b
α =  
02 26.12 p =   2 0.047 r
γ =   3 4.35
α μ =     1 5.28 m
γ =   2 62% v
β =   01 0.29 q
β =   02 17.58 b
β =  
12 15.17 p =   3 2.83 r
γ =   11.96
β μ =     2 5.28 m
γ =   3 28% v
β =   11 4.54 q
β =   12 0.04 q
β =  
22 10.96 p =   0 0.043 r
δ =   0 1.18
β μ =     3 0.64 m
γ =      21 1.71 q
β =   22 5.08 b
β =  
32 5.04 p =   1 0.048 r
δ =   1 12.43
β μ =     10.65 m
δ =    31 0.04 q
β =   32 0.29 b
β =  
  2 0.049 r
δ =   2 5.22
β μ =     1.22 I d
δ =      01 30.64 b
φ =   02 2.20 q
φ =  
   3 1.58 r
δ =   3 0.50
β μ =     0 1.13 m
δ =      11 29.55 b
φ =   12 0.27 q
φ =  
   0.043 d r =   24.44 d
φ =     1 15.41 m
δ =      21 25.84 b
φ =   22 0.03 q
φ =  
   0.043 ρ =   0 57.36
φ μ =     2 10.82 m
δ =    31 23.30 b
φ =   32 2.30 b
φ =  
      1 4.14
φ μ =     3 6.84 m
δ =      11 2.40 q
λ =   12 6.05 b
λ =  
      2 0.25
φ μ =         21 2.29 q
λ =   22 6.75 b
λ =  
           31 1.50 q
λ =   32 7.25 b
λ =  
1 s p : Price of goods in state $s\in S^*$ 
k r : Mortgage rate offered by bank  { , } k γ δ ∈  
2 s p : Price of houses in state $s\in S^*$ 
k
s r : Short-term loan rate offered by bank  { , } k γ δ ∈  in state 
* sS ∈  
d r : Consumer deposit rate 
d
γ μ :Amount borrowed from consumers in the form of 
deposits by bank γ  
ρ : Interbank rate 
d
γ μ :Amount borrowed from consumers in the form of 
deposits by bank γ  
μ : Mortgage amount 
d
γ μ :Amount borrowed from consumers in the form of 
deposits by bank γ  
s μ : Short-term borrowing by households in state 
* sS ∈  
k
s m : Short-term loan extension by bank  {,} k γ δ ∈  in state 
* sS ∈    17
d
φ : Deposit by agent φ  at t=0 
d
γ μ :Amount borrowed from consumers in the form of 
deposits by bank γ  
k m : Mortgage extension by bank  {,} k γ δ ∈  
d
γ μ :Amount borrowed from consumers in the form of 
deposits by bank γ  
I
γ μ : Interbank borrowing by bank γ  
d
γ μ :Amount borrowed from consumers in the form of 
deposits by bank γ  
I d
δ : Interbank deposits by bank δ  
d
γ μ :Amount borrowed from consumers in the form of 
deposits by bank γ  
h
s v : Effective repayment on mortgage by agent 
{,} h α β ∈  in state sS ∈   1 s q : Amount of goods offered for sale in state 
* sS ∈  
12 , s s bb: Money spent in the goods and housing 
markets in 
* sS ∈   2 s q : Amount of houses offered for sale in state 
* sS ∈  
 
5. Comparative Statics 
 
This section shows the effects of changes in the exogenous variables/parameters of the 
model. Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix describe the directional effects on endogenous 
variables of changing various parameters. Although we have performed a number of 
comparative statics, we discuss in detail only those that we reckon that are the most 
interesting.  The analysis involves the following principles, which derive from the model 
structure\footnote{The reader should bear in mind that the qualitative structure of the 
initial equilibrium does not change. For example, an increase in the price of goods in state 
3 does not mean that this price has become higher than the prices of goods in states 1 and 
2.}: 
 
1.  The determination of interest rates: 
 
Since base money is fiat and the horizon is finite, in the end no household will be left 
with fiat money. Thus, all households will finance their loan repayments to commercial 
banks via their private cash endowment and the initial capital endowments of banks. 
However, since we allow for defaults, the total amount of interest rate repayments is 
adjusted by the corresponding anticipated default rates. In sum, aggregate ex post interest 
rate payments, adjusted for default to commercial banks, is equal to the total amount of 
outside money (i.e. sum of cash monetary and initial commercial banks' endowments). In 
this way, the overall liquidity of the economy and endogenous default co-determine the 
structure of interest rates. 
 
2.  Quantity theory of money proposition: 
 
The model possesses a non-mechanical quantity theory of money. Velocity will always be 
less than or equal to one (one if all interest rates are positive). However, since quantities 
supplied in the markets are chosen by agents (unlike the representative   18
agent model's sell-all assumption), the real velocity of money, that is how many real 
transactions can be undertaken by money per unit of time, is endogenous. The upshot of 
this analysis is that nominal changes (i.e. changes in monetary policy) affect both prices 
and quantities. 
 
3.  Fisher effect: 
 
The nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest rate plus the expected rate of 
inflation.  
5.1 Decrease in the money supply 
Let the Central Bank engage in contractionary monetary policy by decreasing the money 
supply (
CB M ) in the interbank market in the initial period (or equivalently increasing the 
interbank interest rate-ρ ). The effects on the endogenous variables are summarized in 
Table 3. 
  
Increasing the interbank rate induces bank γ  to borrow less from the interbank market 
and therefore to reduce its supply of short-term loans and mortgages to Mr. α and Mr.φ , 
pushing up the corresponding lending rates  0 r
γ  andr
γ . Consequently, Mr. α  reduces his 
short-term and mortgage borrowing, similarly Mr. φ reduces his short-term borrowing 
and subsequent deposits in bankγ . Since bank δ  increases its deposits in the interbank 
market, Mr. β   faces stricter credit conditions in the short-term. So, he will switch 
towards mortgages, which will induce bank δ   to reallocate its portfolio and supply 
slightly more mortgages to him. Finally, from the liquidity structure of interest rates, last 
period short-term interest rates decrease except for bank γ  in the second state. 
 
Given a higher interest rate, trade becomes less efficient
6. Quantities of goods and houses 
traded in the initial period go down and so do prices. We see the quantity theory of money 
in action in our model. The reduction of the money supply, given that the velocity of 
money is at most one, leads, typically, to lower prices and quantities traded. Agent 
heterogeneity, and positive volumes of trade, are necessary for this result to hold. Given 
the low price of housing and the increased mortgage extension by bankδ , Mr. β is led to 
demand more mortgages, which results in higher mortgage rate (r
δ ) for him as well. 
Since less money chases the same amount of goods, by the quantity theory of money 
proposition, prices in the last period will go down as well. Recall that agents default on 
their mortgages when the value of their housing holdings is less than that of their 
mortgage. Thus, lower house prices in the second period will result in lower effective 
returns on the mortgages (which can be interpreted as higher defaults) and even higher 
initial mortgage rates, given rational expectations. An increase in the interbank rate 
resulted not only in higher mortgage extension by the rich bank, but also in lower 
effective returns (higher levels of effective default) when the bad states materialize. 
Although the poor bank reduces its mortgage extension, it does not find itself in a better 
                                                 
6 The reason is that agents encounter a higher transaction cost   19
situation, since the effective return on its mortgages goes down as well when the very bad 
state obtains. 
 
The higher mortgage extension and mortgage rates for bank δ   are not enough to 
outweigh the lower effective returns due to default on mortgages in the bad states of the 
world (i.e., states 2 and 3). The impact on bank γ  is the same. Contractionary monetary 
policy, therefore, results in lower expected profits for the banking sector. 
 
The effect on households differs. For Mr.α    an increase in the interbank rate has a 
negative effect on his welfare. The opposite holds for Mr. β  andλ . 
The welfare of Mr. φ  remains almost unaffected (fig. 2). The decrease in  s α′  welfare is 
mainly due to the fact that he borrows less since he is affiliated with the poor bank. 
Although the price of housing at t=0 goes down, the price of goods decreases even more 
(fig. 3). Mr. β  is affiliated with the rich bank and undertakes a bigger mortgage to take 
advantage of the falling housing prices in the initial period. In conjunction with the falling 
short-term rates in the last period (fig. 4), Mr.  s β′ welfare goes up. Mr. λ benefits as well 
from the lower short-term rates and enjoys an increase in his utility.\\ 
 
In sum, according to the Goodhart-Tsomocos financial stability measure, contractionary 
monetary policy results into higher financial instability since lower banking profits and 
higher default lead to welfare loses in the bad states of nature. 
 
5.2 Liquidity assistance to banks in the very bad state of the world 
Let there be an increase in both banks' capital in the third state of the world, which 
participants in the economy perfectly anticipate (Table 3). This increase can be of the 
form of liquidity assistance by the government or new equity capital. An increase in the 
money endowments in the third state of the world will result in a price increase in goods 
and housing at that state as it is expected from the quantity theory of money. A price 
increase in housing results in a higher effective return for both banks when both Mr. α  
and Mr. β  default on their mortgages. Finding themselves with more money at the very 
bad state of the world, the banks will increase their extension of mortgages at the initial 
period. This will drive the mortgage rates down and the demand for mortgages up. Bank 
δ  will switch its portfolio from interbank deposits towards mortgages, since the latter 
become less risky. Since there is overall more activity and higher prices, when 
government help is anticipated in (very) bad states of the world, interest rates in the short 
loan market go up in the initial period due to increased money demand by households. 
 
Although the effective returns on the mortgages go up and the overall default in absolute 
terms goes down, both banks will sustain a drop in their expected profitability. The reason 
is that the rates on mortgages to which they switch their portfolios go down (fig. 5). In 
addition, bank γ  has to pay a higher interest for the money it borrows from depositors 
and the interbank market, and bank δ   does not fully take advantage of the higher 
interbank rate, since it reallocates its portfolio towards mortgages that obtain higher 
effective returns.   20
 
The welfare of Mr. φ  decreases because the liquidity injection occurs in state 3 where he 
is relatively rich and he suffers a negative wealth effect due to higher prices in that state. 
Apart from Mr.φ , the effect on household welfare is positive (fig. 6). All agentsα , β  
and λ  are better-off since the first two benefit from the lower mortgage rates and all three 
from the lower short-term rates in the last period, which translates into cheaper credit. 
 
Liquidity assistance, unlike contractionary monetary policy, not only reduces aggregate 
default but also improves the real sector of the economy since it eases credit conditions 
households and first-time buyers face. 
 
5.3 Banks become less risk-averse 
Assume that both become more risk-loving (Table 4). The change in risk-aversion is 
anticipated in the first period. Their first response will be to switch from safer to riskier 
investments. Consequently, extension of mortgages goes up and short-term lending goes 
down, which means lower mortgage and higher short-term rates in the initial period. Bank 
δ  also reduces its interbank deposits, which results in bank γ  having less funds to extend 
credit. Mr. α takes advantage of the lower mortgage rates and demands more mortgages. 
He also reduces his sales of goods in the initial period, since he can finance his housing 
purchases with more mortgages, and the transaction cost for selling his goods (short-term 
interest rate) has gone up due to banks' funds reallocation. Mr.β , who is poorly endowed 
in the initial period, will reduce his sales of goods and short-term lending as well. 
However, he will not demand more mortgages as the fall in the mortgage rate he faces 
allows him to maintain his housing purchases. The reason that the mortgage rate falls 
more for Mr. β than for Mr. γ is that he is affiliated with bank δ  which has more funds 
to allocate to mortgages, since it reduces its interbank and short-term lending. The 
demand for housing has increased. However, its initial price will fall. The reason is that 
the initial supply of goods onto the market by Mr. α and Mr. β  has fallen and Mr. φ  has 
to sell more of his housing endowment to fund his purchase of goods. Thus, Mr.  s φ′  
disposal income falls and he allocates less money into the goods markets forcing their 
initial price to go down as well. 
 
Lower housing prices and higher mortgage extension translate into lower effective returns 
on mortgages because of higher aggregate default in the economy in the bad states. 
Depending on the severity of the reduction in risk-aversion and its initial level, aggregate 
default may increase a lot. In our exercise we have chosen a relatively low initial risk-
aversion (in order to capture in the initial equilibrium the conception about banks' risk-
aversion before the crisis), so an even a relatively small increase in the appetite for risk 
results in a 0.5\% increase in aggregate default. Of course, what matters is the directional 
effect and not the absolute number. Unlike our other comparative statics, a change in risk-
aversion, although exogenous in the model, is in reality a choice variable of the banks. 
The reason that they might adopt a more risk-loving behaviour is that they expect higher 
profits. This is consistent with what our model yields. 
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Households' welfare moves in different directions (fig. 7). Mr. α  and Mr. λ  are worse-
off, whereas Mr. β  and Mr. φ  are better-off. The reason that Mr. φ  is better-off is that 
houses are a durable commodity and their price should be affected positively by a 
decrease in the overall risk-aversion in the economy. As a result, the price of housing in 
the initial period decreases less than the price of goods (fig. 8) that generates a slightly 
positive effect on Mr.  s φ′  welfare. Mr.β , who is poorly endowed in the initial period, 
will benefit from the lower mortgage rates and enjoy an increase in his utility. Mr. α  on 
the other hand is worse-off, since he faces a higher interest rate for short-term loans in the 
initial period, which is his main source for funding his housing purchases. Mr. λ  has a 
decrease in his welfare due to the fact that short-term interest rates in the last period go up 
in the presence of higher aggregate default (fig. 9) and the higher real rates of interest. 
 
5.4 Compound comparative static 
 
The comparative statics we examine above do not fully exhibit what we might expect to 
observe in a severe mortgage crisis. For that reason we have performed an exercise of 
letting more than one adverse shocks occur at a time. So we allow for contractionary 
monetary policy and for a decrease in banks' risk-aversion simultaneously . The results 
are summarize in Table 4. 
 
The reduction in the money supply yields a first order effect pushing the interbank rate up. 
Bank δ  increases its interbank lending and reduces its mortgage extension. The reduction 
in risk-aversion will moderate this pressure. The trade-off between these two effects will 
determine whether bank δ  will extend more mortgages or not. In our simulation we find 
that mortgage extension by bank δ   increases. The reduction is more severe for bankγ , 
since it is more dependent on monetary injections. Mortgage rates go up (fig. 10), since 
the demand does not decrease much due to the higher cost of short-term borrowing. 
Prices of goods and housing in all periods and states go down, as predicted by the 
Quantity Theory of Money. The pressure is greater due to lower risk-aversion (as 
discussed above). The result is lower expected returns on mortgages, which translate into 
higher defaults in conjunction with the fact that mortgage rates were higher to start with. 
 
Higher default should mean higher mortgage rates, other things being equal. However, a 
higher appetite for risk pushes mortgage rates down. Nevertheless, these second order 
effects are outweighed by the increased default due to a lower money supply, as analysed 
in the relevant section. An interesting result is that default increases disproportionally 
when contractionary monetary policy is combined with a higher appetite for risk by banks. 
When these adverse shocks occur at the same time, expected repayment on mortgages 
falls more than the aggregate change when they happen independently. In particular, 
nonlinear effects are not trivial as shown in fig. 11. 
 
Expected banking profits go up. On the one hand lower money supply and increased 
default put downward pressure on expected profits and on the other lower risk-aversion 
pushes them up. In our exercise the latter forces prevail, but the effect of the former 
becomes more intense as the money supply continues to decrease.   22
 
The effect on households' welfare differs. Agents that are affiliated with the poor bank, i.e. 
Mr. α and Mr.φ , observe a decrease in their expected welfare. This is due to the fact that 
the stricter credit environment affects poorly capitalized banks more severely. In addition, 
the initial price of goods falls more that of housing (fig. 12) affecting negatively the 
purchasing power of Mr.α , who mainly finances his housing purchase though the sale of 
goods in the initial period. Mr. β is able to benefit from the falling price of housing in the 
initial period via entering a mortgage contract, since he is affiliated with a well 
capitalized -more risk-loving- bank, and his welfare increases. Housing prices in state 1 
fall more than goods' prices (fig. 13) due to the fact that Mr. φ  decreased its deposits in 
the initial period and increases his sales of housing in that state to finance the purchase of 
goods. The lower demand for money by Mr. β  in the last period (partially due to lower 
prices and higher defaults) and the well-capitalized position of bank δ  put downward 
pressure on the short-term interest rates at the states in which agents default. Mr. λ  
benefits from the looser credit condition and enjoys a higher utility. 
 
However, lower banking profits in the two bad states combined with relatively much 
higher aggregate default (as compared to contractionary monetary policy only) result into 
higher welfare losses in these states. Hence, we see that contractionary monetary policy 
coupled with an attempt to gamble to resurrect on behalf of the banks exacerbates the 




Central Bank officials are prone to describe the months since August 2007 as being akin 
to war-time, as contrasted with more normal peace-time.  In longer run time-series 
econometric exercises stretching back, say, to 1900, the war years of WWI, 1914-18, and 
WWII, 1939-45, are frequently omitted (or dummied out) as involving regimes and 
structures too a-typical for normal analysis.  By analogy the years 2007/8 may also 
become excluded from standard econometric analysis as too extraordinary to fit with our 
standard models.  After all such standard models abstract from counter-party risk, from 
default, from endogenous risk premia, and even from financial intermediation. 
 
If, however, we do want to address, and to model, current events, then we need a model 
which incorporates default as a central feature, and in which credit risk is endogenous 
(not an exogenous add-on).  The model which we have explored above is such a model.  
It is, however, an initial, preliminary attempt.  Much more needs to be done. 
 
For example, it is an endowment model.  Thus the economy has a given time path of 
goods, houses, capital and fiat money.  With such predetermined endowments, the 
resulting time-path of prices, interest rates and quantities just redistributes goods and 
assets between agents.  The welfare implications are never clear-cut since some gain and 
others lose.  In order to explore the welfare implications of financial crises, they have to 
be incorporated into a production economy, wherein a credit crunch adversely impacts   23
upon output and employment, so that real incomes become generally reduced, not just 
redistributed.  This can be done.  As an additional step we do not think that that will be 
too difficult. 
 
In general, the results of our simulations are more or less what most economists would 
have imagined.  Tight money reduces prices and quantities traded.  Government support 
to banks in crises stabilizes the economy.  When banks become risk-loving, a subsequent 
crisis becomes even more extreme.  We are encouraged that our model reproduces 
common-sense outcomes.  The direction of effects seems correct. 
 
This raises the question whether such a model as this can be taken beyond numerical 
solution and simulation to the actual data.  Could it be used to try to match and to 
calibrate the actual time path of the major data series in existing countries and to explore 
alternative policy options in real time?  We believe that it can, though it will not be 
straightforward to do so. 
 
Running simulations often provides the authors with more illumination than to the readers 
of the resulting paper.  One of the lessons that this exercise has taught us concerns the 
limitations of a strict rational expectations (RE) model.  In such an RE model, an event in 
some subsequent period, such as a change in risk aversion, or a change in government 
policy, may be regarded at the outset as a low probability event, but in a fully rational 
world it cannot by definition have been entirely unexpected.  One cannot run simulations, 
in an RE world, in which the completely unexpected occurs.  This makes it rather harder 
to simulate extraordinary time periods such as 2007/8.  Thus, for example, the risk-
seeking behaviour of financial intermediaries in 2004-6, gave way to strong risk aversion 
in 2007/8 in a way that was entirely unexpected in 2004-6.  Had it been anticipated, it 
would have been discounted in an RE system.  So what one has to do is assume that 
unexpected changes of behaviour were actually previously expected, but with an 
extremely small probability, for example that there would be a generalized fall in US 
housing prices.  When we started on this exercise, we had not appreciated this.  It also 
raises the philosophical question whether the subjective probability distribution of actual 
expectations, based on some combination of the accidents of human history and the 
limited stretch of our imaginations, can ever approximate to the true underlying objective 
probability distribution.  If that approximation is partial at best, in what sense can 
expectations be held to be 'rational'?  Keynes and Shackle would have appreciated that 
question. 
 
But our purpose is not so much to query the current RE methodology as to demonstrate 
that within the format of existing model best-practice, it should be possible to model a 
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We illustrate the results from the comparative statics exercise in two tables. The 
directional effect of a change in the respective(s) exogenous variable(s) is presented. The 
diagrams used in the above analysis are included. Other comparative statics we have 
performed include a decrease in the liquidity in the short-term loan markets in the last 
period, a decrease in banks' initial capital, a decrease in banks' capital in the last period, a 
change in agents' expectations regarding the occurrence of each state of the world and a 
production shock in the goods market. The results can be found in our working paper 
(Goodhart, Tsomocos and Vardoulakis (2009)). 
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Figure 2: Household welfare vs money suplí 
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Money supply at t=0
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Figure 4: Short-term interest rates by bank  δ vs money supply  
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Figure 6: household welfare vs banks’ capital in state 3 
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Figure 8: Housing and goods prices at t=0 vs banks’ risk-aversion 









‐1 ‐0.75 ‐0.5 ‐0.25 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Banks' risk‐aversion
initial state 1 state 2 state 3
 







-0.06 -0.055 -0.05 -0.045 -0.04 -0.035 -0.03 -0.025 -0.02 -0.015 -0.01 -0.005 0
Shocks more severe to the left
Mortgage rate offered by bank gamma Mortgage rate offered by bank delta
 
Figure 10: Mortgage rates vs compound decrease in money supply and in banks’ risk-
aversion 
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Figure 11: Nonlinear effects on mortgage repayment vs compound decrease in money 
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Figure 12: Housing and goods prices at t=0 vs compound decrease in money supply and 
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Figure 13: Housing and goods prices in state 1 vs compound decrease in money supply 
and in banks’ risk-aversion 
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